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Maturing Strategies of Russian Multinational Companies: 
Comparisons with Chinese Multinationals  
 
Wladimir Andreff1 
 
Analysing the strategies of Russian multinational companies (MNCs) has actually become a 
new avenue for economic research but the topic is covered by only few publications so far. 
The present chapter first reminds in which circumstances Russian companies grew 
multinational and then started booming, and how they were muddling through the financial 
crisis that burst out in 2008; in this respect, they do not compare too bad with MNCs from 
other transition countries. The geographical and industrial specificities of their expansion 
abroad are pointed out as well as the major determinants of their outward foreign direst 
investment (OFDI). In the past decade, their strategies have evolved from total opacity to 
more transparency and, in some cases have matured enough to get closer to genuine global 
strategies while their relationships with the Russian government have strengthened. Thus 
Russian MNCs make up for major pillars of state capitalism in Russia. A comparative 
assessment with Chinese MNCs shows deeper similarities than differences in spite of the first 
mover advantage that has benefited to OFDI from China over OFDI from other transition 
economies, of which Russia.    
 
1. The emergence of Russian multinational companies 
 
With the transformation of the former Soviet system into a market economy the so-called “red 
multinationals” (Gutman, 1990; Hamilton, 1986; McMillan 1987; Sokolov, 1991) based in 
centrally planned economies vanished nearly overnight; altogether they were disposing of 175 
subsidiaries abroad in 1990. The economic crisis that went alongside with transformational 
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recession (Kornaï, 1994) had spread over the first years of transition and entailed the decline 
of former red MNCs, including those with headquarters in Russia. After 1991, these firms 
were confronted with new economic and financial constraints. Their liquidities dried out 
overnight and they were no longer able to fund their foreign subsidiaries. Many of them 
closed down due to under-capitalisation. Others went bankrupt or were taken over by foreign 
investors or new domestic oligarchs. All reduced their investment abroad and in some 
transition countries FDI outflows were practically phased out for some years (Svetlicic, 
1997). Transformational recession did affect Russian MNCs just like it happened to hit many 
companies inside Russia: they lost domestic outlets and a significant part of their traditional 
trade with former Comecon countries; they suffered from dramatic credit crunch and hard 
currency shortage; their entire production and distribution networks were disorganised by the 
collapse of central planning. The OFDI stock from the USSR fell from $ 699 million in 1990 
down to a negligible value, close to nil in 1992 and 1993. For a while the pecking order in 
most Russian companies was topped by privatisation and restructuring, not investing abroad.  
Paradoxically enough, a number of Russian firms spontaneously transformed into MNCs 
overnight simply because they were located in more than one former Soviet republic. Since 
these republics obtained the status of new independent states by end of 1991 or in 1992, a 
same company located in two or more former Soviet republics – it was often so under central 
planning - became all at once a multinational company. The break-up of the Soviet Union into 
15 new nation states came out with an institutional creation of Russian MNCs, the so-called 
“born multinational” companies (Liuhto, 2001). Besides, many Russian firms were turned 
into monopolistic or oligopolistic MNCs through a rushed privatisation from which foreign 
investors were almost entirely excluded such as mass privatisation in 1992 and the loans for 
shares scheme in 1995. From the mid-nineties on, the number of subsidiaries settled abroad 
by Russian firms started growing again and was already counted in the thousand in 2000 
(Liuhto and Jumpponen, 2001) because the aforementioned institutional multinationalisation 
through splitting the former USSR was relayed since 1994 by a recovery in new FDI outflows 
from Russia  (Andreff, 2002). However, if 1994 is the milestone for a new emergence of 
Russian MNCs, one has to wait until 2000 and the end of the 1998 Russian financial crash 
economic consequences to witness a steady growth at swift pace of Russian FDI outflows and 
OFDI stocks (Table 1). Most of the biggest 100 Russian firms have gone multinational since 
1999 or so (Andreff, 2003b).  
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During the lapse of time they took to emerge in the 1990s, MNCs from transition economies, 
of which Russian MNCs, looked very much like MNCs from developing countries and their 
major features differentiated them from big MNCs based in developed countries, that is: 
. They were not all or not primarily in private ownership; still a significant number of them 
were state-owned. 
. They had a modest size compared to Western and Japanese MNCs. 
. The government often interfered heavily in their strategies, much more than it is used to do 
in developed countries. 
. The great bulk of their OFDI was located in neighbouring and border countries or in the 
same geographical region as the home country, which is a significant difference with big 
Western MNCs. 
. The number of countries hosting their foreign subsidiaries was comparatively low. 
. Each of these MNCs had only settled a small number of subsidiaries abroad. 
. They had primarily invested abroad in the manufacturing industry while big MNCs from 
developed countries were already privileging the tertiary sector for their OFDI. 
. The quality of their products and their profitability was quite below those of big MNCs. 
However, some of these features were used as specific competitive advantages to challenge 
big MNCs from developed countries through market-seeking OFDI targeted at new markets. 
Only few Russian and Eastern European MNCs were investing abroad with an efficiency-
seeking objective – looking for lower unit labour cost abroad - since their domestic 
production costs were comparatively low after the transition shock.  
Econometric testing (Andreff, 2003c) has verified that the investment development path – IDP 
– model (Dunning, 1981, 1988 & 1993; Dunning and Narula, 1998) fits with the development 
of MNCs from transition economies in their early stage of emergence. Let us remind that in a 
first step of the IDP model, a country does not either invest abroad or host any inward FDI. In 
a second step, a country increasingly attracts inward FDI and achieves her (few) first OFDI 
projects; she markedly is a net FDI importer. In a third step, thanks to new technological 
competences and rather low unit labour cost, a country appeals a lot of inward FDI while her 
home-based companies start investing substantially abroad; however, she keeps on being a net 
FDI importer. A (now advanced developed) country in the fourth step invests more abroad 
than she is invested from abroad, i.e. by inward FDI; she becomes a net FDI exporter. In a 
final step, inward and outward FDI are nearly balanced and of the biggest magnitude in the 
most developed countries of the world. Applied to transition countries in the 1990s, this 
model was ranking most of them, up to 1999, in the second step, some were ranked in the first 
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step (Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Uzbekistan) and a few were close to the third 
step. The latter already exhibited important OFDI compared to the size of their domestic 
economies: Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia. Russia was in the second step at the moment, not 
far from the third one, and this was confirmed in a further study (Kalotay, 2004a). 
The aforementioned econometric exercise showed that OFDI from transition countries was 
primarily explained by two variables, their level of economic development (GDP per capita) 
and their industrial structure - the respective share of the primary sector, different 
manufacturing industries, and services). The domestic technological level, to a lesser extent, 
had an explanatory power. In some countries like Russia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan) natural 
resource endowment was a significant variable as well. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Since 2000, OFDI skyrocketed and reached a non negligible weight compared to the Russian 
domestic economy (19.8% for the OFDI stock/GDP ratio in 2007). A dramatic boom began in 
2003 and climaxed in 2007
2
. The current value of FDI outflows was multiplied by 17 from 
2000 to 2008, and accounted for nearly 17% of domestic gross fixed capital formation in 2007 
(Table 1). The OFDI stock from Russia – which measures how much past Russian MNCs 
investments abroad resulted in terms of asset holding – peaked up at $ 255 billion right before 
the global financial crisis in 2007, ranking Russia among the dozen most important foreign 
investors in the world. However, the crisis impacted the OFDI stock in 2008 and FDI 
outflows in 2009; both recovered one year after, following a trend comparable to OFDI from 
most emerging countries (Andreff, 2013). A last index leans us to assess that Russia went up 
to the third step of Dunning‟s IDP in the 2000s – and may come closer to the fourth step in 
the 2010s - which is the ratio between FDI outward and inward stock, in the range of 75% to 
95% from 2007 to 2011 - the fourth step is characterised by a stabilised ratio over 100%
3
. 
 
2. Outward FDI from Russia: comparison with other transition economies and China 
 
Their EU accession strongly boosted Central Eastern European countries‟ (CEECs) inward 
and outward FDI (Kalotay, 2006). Firms based in the new EU members emerged as serious 
competitors in the market for OFDI of an enlarged Europe (M. & W. Andreff, 2005) – FDI 
outflows from the CEECs have multiplied by 28 in eight years, from €100 million in 1995 to 
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€2.8 billion in 2003. This success story of MNCs from transition economies is rooted in their 
specific competitive advantages: a unit labour cost much lower than in EU incumbent 
members, a swift productivity growth since 2000, a lax tax system rather easy to circumvent, 
and soft enforcement of some harmonised European rules (acquis communautaire).  
Despite such a momentum in their expansion abroad fuelled by EU enlargement, MNCs from 
the CEECs have not been growing as fast as Russia-based MNCs in the 2000s; the growth of 
the former OFDI stock – multiplied by 10 between 2000 and 2007 - was not as swift as the 
latter‟s – multiplied by nearly 13 (Table 2). Consequently, the magnitude of the OFDI stock 
from Russia was three times bigger than the one from the ten CEECs altogether in 2000; it 
went up to four times bigger in 2007. From 1999 to 2007, the growth of OFDI from Russia 
has also been faster than the one from the so-called BRICs (Andreff, 2013). For instance, 
Chinese OFDI (Hong Kong excluded) multiplied by 3.5 from 2000 to 2007. In 2000, the 
OFDI stock from China was bigger than from Russia; in 2007, the latter was 2.5 times bigger 
than the former. If we consider China and Hong Kong together, the OFDI stock multiplied by 
2.7 from 2000 to 2007 and was 4 times bigger than the Russian one in 2007. Anyway, in the 
early 2000s, Russian OFDI achieved a world record in terms of growth. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
In relative terms (Table 3), Russian OFDI upgraded its structure compared with the 27 
transition countries when it comes to the two following criteria: a ratio between the OFDI 
stock and domestic GDP on the one hand and, on the other hand, a ratio of outward to inward 
FDI stock. In 1999, according to the first ratio, Russia was ranked 8
th
 among transition 
countries and was already on the top regarding the second ratio. In 2007, its ranking had 
improved as regard the first ratio (2
nd
 rank behind Estonia) and still had the lead with the 
second ratio. In 2011, Russia was top for both ratios. If we require both a ratio of OFDI stock 
to GDP markedly higher than 5% and an outward/inward FDI stock higher than 25% as the 
thresholds to the third step of Dunning‟s IDP model, Russian OFDI has clearly reached it 
before the financial crisis, joining there the most advanced transition economies in terms of 
OFDI such as Estonia, Slovenia and Azerbaijan in 2007 (Hungary and Poland reached it in 
2011). OFDI from mainland China (Hong Kong excluded), still ahead of Russia as to the first 
ratio in 1999, paradoxically
4
 reached the third step of IDP model only after 2007, later than 
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Russian OFDI
5
. If one accounts for Hong Kong together with China, they are in the third step 
since the early 1990s.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
From their swift pre-crisis expansion the biggest Russian MNCs held important assets abroad 
in 2007 and had big enough overall revenues in 2009 (Table 4). Their average size is much 
bigger than the one of MNCs based in other transition countries. Calculated after UNCTAD 
data in dividing the OFDI stock by the number of foreign subsidiaries, the average size of a 
Russian MNC‟s subsidiary was $70 million (in 2004). This is quite bigger than even the 
average size of Latvian ($41 million in 2008), Polish ($19 million in 2001), Estonian and 
Lithuanian ($5 million in 2007), and Slovak ($4 million in 2008) MNC‟s parent companies. 
With regards to the average size of foreign subsidiaries, it ranges between a few hundred 
thousand dollars with subsidiaries of Polish and Czech MNCs up to about $2 million for 
Estonian subsidiaries. Russian MNCs look like giants in a population of dwarfs. In terms of 
overall revenues 30 Russian multinational parent companies ranked among the biggest 500 
European firms in 2009. Most of the biggest Russian MNCs (14 out of 25 in the 2007 list and 
20 out of 30 in 2009) are directly or indirectly natural resource-based in oil-gas, mining and 
metallurgical industries. Until 2007, Russian MNCs showed a double-digit growth and high 
profitability (Kalotay, 2008b).  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Probably less than 1,000 Russian firms
6
 may have invested abroad. However, despite their 
growing size, no one Russian MNC has entered yet the list of top 100 biggest non financial 
MNCs ranked by UNCTAD according to the value of their foreign assets. Jardin Matheson 
(Hong Kong) came into this ranking in 2005 (98
th
), Hutchinson Whampoa (Hong Kong) and 
CITIC (as the 100
th
) in 2007. In the Fortune Global 500, 29 Chinese MNCs are found in 2008 
(61 in 2011) and only 5 Russian MNCs (7 in 2011). In the Forbes ranking of 2,000 global 
companies, before the crisis (in 2007), there were 109 Chinese (including Hong Kong), 48 
Indian, 34 Brazilian and only 29 Russian MNCs. In the BCG 100 list of emerging MNCs 
(2008), 41 were Chinese, 20 Indian, 13 Brazilian and only 6 Russian.  
 
3. Russian outward FDI muddling through the crisis 
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What is at stake during the current global financial crisis and economic recession is to know 
whether Russian OFDI would be able to get closer to the fourth IDP step with an outward 
stock steadily bigger than its inward stock. The crisis has triggered a collapse of world FDI 
outflows, primarily from developed countries, in 2008 and 2009; but it has only slowed down 
the growth of the OFDI stock worldwide in 2009, according to UNCTAD data. As against this 
worldwide trend, Russian OFDI was harshly affected by the crisis with a cut in its stock value 
(not only a fall in outflows) in 2008, due to both divestments from abroad and foreign asset 
depreciation. In 2009, its renewed growth was not enough to recover its 2007 level. Russian 
MNCs have been stifled by a lack of external finance. Moreover, the corporate debt of large 
Russian firms rose (up to $110 billion in 2009). MNCs like Rusal, Norilsk Nickel, TMK and 
Sistema were among the most indebted Russian companies. However, Russian OFDI stock 
grew again by 74% in 2010 fuelled by new investments abroad, foreign asset appreciation and 
likely capital flight; it lost 17% in 2011. This did not compromise its overall growing trend 
(the stock was 18 times bigger in 2011 than 2000); but these figures exhibit that crisis entails 
a much higher instability in OFDI from Russia, just like from many countries. This might 
postpone Russia breaking through the threshold of the IDP model‟s fourth step.  
OFDI from the new EU members was apparently less affected by the crisis with an overall 
stock still growing every year between 2007 and 2011. However this is due to a fast growing 
trend in OFDI from Poland and Slovakia. OFDI suffered from the crisis with a sharp decline 
in Estonia and Latvia since 2009, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia since 2010, and Hungary 
only in 2008. Eventually Russian OFDI did not perform that bad comparatively to transition 
countries when it comes to muddling through the crisis. The OFDI stock from China did even 
better so that it slightly passed over the value of the Russian one again in 2011.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
A more negative impact of the crisis on OFDI may be that a number of MNCs divest from 
abroad. Selling the assets of foreign subsidiaries can help finance a parent company in 
financial distress. A MNC can always take the crisis as an excuse for cutting down some less 
profitable activities located in a subsidiary abroad. This obviously happened to Russian 
MNCs‟ foreign subsidiaries since 2008 (Table 5) whose foreign direct divestment was 
primarily concentrated in the EU and CIS countries, in particular Ukraine. Russian divestment 
also occurred in tax havens. Two examples are Millhouse, a Russian-owned asset 
management fund (a Roman Abramovich‟s property) which divested from the company 
Primerod International Ltd located in the Virgin Islands in 2009, and Gazprom which sold its 
holding ZGG Cayman Holding in the Cayman Islands in 2010.  
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The OFDI stock from Russia was 1.4 times bigger in 2011 than 2007 in spite of the crisis 
impact. The crisis shock has been dramatic, not radical. Russian MNCs were born in such an 
unstable domestic business and institutional environment surrounded by transformational 
recession, then they went through the 1998 Russian financial crisis. From all these sequences 
they have learned a lot about how adapt to financial crash and credit crunch. This underlies 
their resilience to adverse economic effects in the global financial crisis.  
 
4. From outward FDI determinants to MNCs strategies: an analytical synthesis 
 
The rest of this chapter refers to an analytical framework which must be briefly reminded. 
Contemporaneous analyses of OFDI regarding emerging countries and their MNCs often 
distinguish between pull factors and push factors (Dunning, 2008; Gugler and Boie, 2008). 
Pull factors are those which attract and drive inward FDI into a given country, otherwise 
coined host country‟s factors of attractiveness to FDI. They differentiate host countries. Some 
well-known and tested examples are: host investment climate and country risk, the judicial 
and fiscal environment provided to foreign investors and host government policies (of which 
liberalisation and privatisation), host country‟s inflation rate, growth rate, interest rate and 
spread, fiscal deficit, exchange rate, unemployment rate, unit labour cost, market size, tax 
pressure, access to local high technology or natural resources, and the quality of local 
institutions such as the rule of law, the efficiency of government expenditure, political 
stability and control of corruption (tested in M. & W. Andreff, 1997 & 2005), as well as host 
country‟s participation to regional international agreements and trade areas. Thus, when 
analysing OFDI, the explanatory power of pull factors is basically to point out which host 
countries do attract foreign investments flowing from any home country. In other words, pull 
factors definitely are the determinants of the geographical distribution between host countries 
of OFDI from (a given set of) home countries.  
Push factors usually are referred to as home country-specific. They basically are drivers for a 
home country substituting investment abroad to domestic investment; they explain why 
investment is pushed outwards the domestic borders. Push factors obviously underlie the IDP 
model such as the domestic market size (GDP or population as a proxy) and economic 
development (GDP per capita), its technological level, its industrial structure (the distribution 
of value added across different industries) and less stable variables such as growth rate and 
exchange rate (Andreff, 2003c). In addition, often listed push factors are: excess domestic 
production capacity, domestic market saturation, home competitive pressures, trade barriers, 
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increasing domestic production costs, inflation hikes, using the domestic natural resource base 
for expanding abroad, underdeveloped domestic capital market, bad or worsening local 
business environment that triggers investing abroad to hedge against domestic uncertain 
investment climate, domestic government policies; and, in post-communist countries, 
escaping the troubles of an economic system in transition (Bulatov, 1998).  
Now, which are the relationships between OFDI pull and push factors on the one hand and, on 
the other hand, the strategies of MNCs? Pull factors are the determinants of a MNC (outward 
investor) trade-off between host countries and between resource-seeking, market-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking and asset-seeking strategies typified by Dunning, and a possible global 
strategy. The latter is a MNC multi-faceted strategy – not only restricted to a geographical 
dimension or a set of industries – and merges market, efficiency, resource and asset-seeking 
FDI motives. It is analysed in depth as global in scope, distributing all the MNC‟s chain value 
all over the globe, maximising the parent company‟s global (consolidated) profit typical in 
global oligopolies, based on a post-Fordist high tech and flexible production process that can 
easily be fragmented and relocated (Andreff, 2009a), a networking organisation, strategic 
alliances with other MNCs, and the internationalisation of shareholding (Andreff, 1999a & 
2003a; Yip 1997). Pull factors determine a MNC choice to invest in one host country rather 
than another one on the basis of their attractiveness variables (Andreff 1999b; Michalet 1997 
& 1999). Thus, they appeal MNCs in various host countries, largely shape the OFDI 
geographical distribution and provide the rationale for the different strategies used to invest in 
various host countries, including the best appropriate mode of entry to each strategy. 
The relationships between OFDI push factors and MNC strategies are straightforward. Push 
factors are the determinants of a company‟s propensity to substitute OFDI to domestic 
investment and they are embedded in the home country‟s economy: the domestic market size, 
its level of economic development, its macroeconomic variables (inflation, growth, 
unemployment, exchange rates, etc.), the domestic costs of factors of production, home 
investment regulation, if any, and institutions, how the home government interacts with 
companies‟ investment decisions, all factors that may depend on domestic industries and 
markets a company is involved in. Therefore, push factors are determined by domestic 
macroeconomic dynamics and industrial structure and, thus, widely determine home country‟s 
MNCs from one industry rather than another to invest abroad. They are drivers of the FDI 
outflows, foreign assets and foreign subsidiaries industrial distribution achieved by home-
based MNCs, and to some extent they are linked to the IDP step a home country is evolving 
in. Consequently, push factors influence the FDI “mode of leaving” a home country, namely a 
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MNC‟s trade-off between greenfield investment, mergers and acquisitions (M&As), round 
tripping FDI and capital flight.  
Thus, a MNC undertakes a FDI when pull and push factors fit together - and the mode of 
leaving a home country is in accordance with the mode of entry in a given host country. A 
MNC operating in a small or slow-growing or saturated domestic market adopts a market-
seeking strategy geared towards bigger or fast-growing host markets. High or increasing 
domestic unit production costs determine MNCs to seek host countries with lower unit costs 
through an efficiency-seeking FDI. Scarce or shortening natural resources at home push 
MNCs to secure their input supply from well-endowed host countries with a resource-seeking 
strategy. These double fits between domestic push factors and host countries‟ pull factors 
crucially determine the OFDI geographical distribution and industrial structure. 
 
5. Specificities and determinants of outward FDI from Russia 
 
Although OFDI from Russia is the 15
th
 most important source of OFDI worldwide in 2011, 
just behind China and right ahead of Sweden, it is sometimes coined “non-conventional” 
(Kuznetsov, 2010a). For sure, it is quite specific with regards to its geographical distribution, 
industrial structure, and determinants. 
 
5.1. Geographical and industrial specificities of Russian outward FDI 
 
Data collection by the Central Bank of Russia covers four different FDI outflows: a/ Not 
exclusively financial investment abroad by Russian firms and banks. b/ Individual investment 
by Russian citizens in real estate abroad, including the money invested by new rich, some 
maffiosi, capital flight, and money laundering. c/ Round tripping FDI, i.e. investment by 
Russian enterprises and citizens in offshore companies, in particular in Cyprus, the Virgin 
Islands and other tax havens, in view of reinvesting the corresponding capital later on in 
Russia
7
; since Russian OFDI  located in tax havens still represents a significant share among 
host countries (Table 6), round tripping probably has not ceased yet
8
. d/ Investment abroad by 
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Russian investment funds and some minor investments
9
. Statistical knowledge about the last 
three sorts of FDI outflows is blurred – when not entirely hidden – by non transparent 
transactions; the first and third kinds of FDI outflows are the most tightly related to the 
booming expansion of Russian MNCs.  
The initial geographical orientation of Russian OFDI was geared towards the “close abroad”, 
i.e. the CIS independent member states, as a legacy from the past. Various studies confirmed a 
significant involvement of Russian FDI in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (Yeremeyeva, 
2009; Blyakha, 2009). The next most important host countries are the CEECs as former 
CMEA (Comecon) members in which, like in the CIS, Russian companies enjoy familiarity 
with local business conditions. Then follow the EU incumbent members which, in a short 
lapse of time, have taken place among the significant host countries for Russian OFDI 
(Andreff, 2003c). Such geographical distribution was specific to the first decade of Russian 
companies‟ expansion abroad. It can still be traced back from the distribution of foreign assets 
in the biggest 20 Russian non financial MNCs in 2008: 23% were located in CIS countries, 
49% in Europe, 17% in North America, 7% in Africa, 4% in Asia and peanuts in Latin 
America.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
In the past recent years, the OFDI geographical distribution has started changing (Table 6). 
More non European countries now appear among the major host areas for Russian MNCs 
settlement, namely the U.S., Canada, the United Arab Emirates, and India. Since 2005, 
Russian MNCs have made noticeable acquisitions in developing countries, focusing on Asia 
and Africa (Kalotay, 2008b). To some extent, Russian MNCs are somewhat loosing their 
specificity as companies from emerging countries supposed to achieve most of their OFDI on 
an “intra-regional” base in countries located in the same region of the world as their home 
country
10
. Thus, some Russian MNCs are on the brink of a global strategy in which foreign 
subsidiaries are located anywhere in the world if their profitability there is higher. The only 
exception so far is Latin America – with no one of the first 30 host countries for Russian FDI 
that belongs to – due to its remote location from Russia and institutional barriers such as 
absent bilateral non double taxation and investment treaties with Russia.  
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Note that tax havens are highly ranked among the major host countries for Russian OFDI: 
Cyprus, the Virgin Islands, Luxembourg, Jersey, Gibraltar, Bahamas, St Vincent & 
Grenadines, St Kitts & Nevis, Bermuda, and the Isle of Man; together they attract about 58% 
of overall OFDI. Most of them, like Cyprus, are well-known rocket pads for round tripping 
circular investment. Apart from tax havens, the major host countries for Russian MNCs show 
up one of the four following characteristics: a/ they belong to major export markets for 
Russian products (the Netherlands, the UK, Germany, Austria, Turkey, Spain, Bulgaria, 
France); b/ they share a common culture and use Russian as business language (Belarus, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Armenia, Uzbekistan); c/ they have tight political links with 
Russia (Belarus engaged talks for years in view of merging with Russia, Kazakhstan joined a 
free trade area with Russia and Belarus); d/ and a few markets are located at a remote trade 
distance from Russia (USA, Canada). These characteristics tend to validate the assumption 
that Russian firms‟ internationalisation proceeds step by step (as meant in the Uppsala theory: 
Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) starting with exporting to foreign markets then, when such exports 
are a success story, accompanying the export business with OFDI.   
The industrial structure of Russian OFDI
11
 is also specific when compared to both emerging 
countries‟ OFDI and the structure of the domestic economy in Russia. In 2008, as to Rosstat 
data, the Russian economy‟s GDP broke down into: 21.3% for trade, 18.0% for the 
manufacturing industry, 15.0% for services (including finance), 9.6% for transport and 
communication, 9.5% for the mining industry, 6.7% for construction, 5.9% for education, 
health and the social sector, 5.1% for administration, defence and social insurance, 5.0% for 
agriculture, and 3.0% for electricity, gas and water. The industrial distribution of Russian 
OFDI is much more concentrated on few industries. First, Russian MNCs are overrepresented 
in natural resource exploitation, mining and metallurgical industries, then in traditional 
manufacturing industries, all inherited from the top pecking order of heavy industries in the 
former Soviet system. Cases in point are Gazprom (gas, oil), Lukoil, Itera, Tatneft, Novatek in 
the oil industry; Severstal, Evraz, Norilsk Nickel, Alrosa, Basic Element (a conglomerate 
which owns Rusal), NMLK, Mechel, TMK, Koks, Metalloinvest, MMK, and Novolipetsk 
Steel in the metallurgical industry; Renova, OMZ and Borodino in machinery; AvtoVAZ, 
GAZ, UAZ and KAMAZ in the automobile industry; and in various industries, Investlesprom 
(paper-wood), Eurocement and LSR Group (building materials), Eurochem (chemical 
                                                 
11
 The Central Bank of Russia does not publish (yet) a breakdown of OFDI by industry that can compare with 
the MOFCOM data used below for the industrial structure of Chinese OFDI. However, Chinese data are 
somewhat blurred with regards to those flows transiting through Hong Kong.  
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fertilizers), Acron (agro-chemistry), Vostok-service and Gloria Jeans (clothing), Kalina 
(perfumes, cosmetics), WimmBillDann, Russian Solod, SGI Group, Alterwest and Russian 
Wine Trust (agro-food industry) and Inter RAO UES (electricity).  
However, it is to be noticed that Russian OFDI also started booming in the 2000s in a more 
modernised part of the manufacturing industry with the Sistema group (to which belong MTS 
in telephone production, Sitronics in telecommunication equipment, and RTI Systems in 
aerospace and missiles production), Vimpelcom, Altimo, Megafon and the Alfa Group in 
telecommunications, Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia (aeronautics), NPO 
Mashinostroyenia (military equipment), as well as most of the big Russian insurance and 
financial companies, big banks such as Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Alfa-bank and Bank 
of Moscow, and transportation networks (Sovcomflot). Such MNCs exemplify a more recent 
industrial diversification of Russian OFDI which spreads over high tech industries and 
services resulting from the modernisation of the Russian manufacturing industry which was 
launched at the dawn of the post-Soviet transition and became more deeply rooted after 1999. 
 
 5.2. The determinants of OFDI and trans-border mergers and acquisitions 
 
A genuine theory specifically explaining the strategies of Russian MNCs and the determinants 
of their OFDI is not available so far. Obviously, such theory should not be far away from the 
analysis of OFDI determinants from the BRICs and emerging countries in the framework of 
the IDP model. Though successfully tested for transition countries taken together (Andreff, 
2003c), the latter does not entirely account for the whole specificity of Russian MNCs. It is 
even contented that Russian OFDI is not actually verifying the IDP model (Kalotay, 2008a) 
because it started up as a form of capital flight linked to bad domestic investment climate until 
1998. Moreover, a number of companies became MNCs overnight with the break-up of the 
former Soviet Union whereas those assets grabbed by a handful of powerful oligarchs in the 
privatisation drive had rapidly evolved into MNCs. Besides, a number of Russian MNCs 
compare to those MNCs based in developed countries (Kuznetsov, 2010b), as if Russia was 
on the verge of reaching the fourth step of IDP model. Companies with a rapid 
internationalisation in telecommunications (Sistema, Vimpelcom) and middle technology-
based Russian MNCs such as Tecnoserv, Croc, LANIT and Playton are standing there. 
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Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) have suggested the following explanatory model
12
, supposed 
to specifically fit with Russian OFDI. Econometric testing relies only on data about trans-
border M&As involving Russian firms which is indeed a major part of Russia‟s overall OFDI. 
The model primarily takes on board pull factors:  
 
FDIMArh = a + b.GDPh + c.GDPr + d.NRh + e.SERh + f.DISTrh + g.rh + i.CIS + j.PATh + uh 
 
where the independent variable FDIMArh stands for OFDI from Russia to a host country h 
achieved by means of merging or acquiring a foreign company. Independent variables are: 
. Russia‟s and host country‟s GDP, as proxies for the respective size of their markets; 
. the share NRh of natural resources and raw materials in overall Russian exports to each host 
country h, which is assumed to reflect its comparative endowment in natural resources;  
. the share of services in the host country‟s GDP SERh ; 
. the geographical distance between Russia and each host country DISTrh , a classical gravity 
variable;  
. the rouble exchange rate against a host country‟s currency rh ; 
. a dummy variable standing for CIS membership which is assumed to represent a cultural 
proximity between Russia and a host country; 
. the number of patents registered in a host country PATh showing whether a country h is a 
favourable location for Russian MNCs where to acquire technological assets. 
It results from econometric testing that market size is the most significant explanatory 
variable: Russian MNCs first invest abroad to capture foreign markets. The NRh variable is 
also significant: Russian MNCs invest abroad to secure their supply of natural resources. The 
share of the tertiary sector (services) in the host economy, the distance from Russia, exchange 
rate, and the cultural proximity are not significant determinants of Russian OFDI. Despite its 
obvious interest, this modelling is submitted to two limitations: it does not explain at all the 
determinants of Russian greenfield investment abroad – if by chance they were different from 
those of M&As - and, more basically, it does not introduce either a dummy variable for the 
influence of Russian government
13
 on the strategies conducted by Russian MNCs, whatever 
state-owned or privately-owned, or any other push factor.  
                                                 
12
 Technically speaking, it is a log-linear model which all variables are in log except the geographical distance 
and a dummy for CIS membership.  
13
 Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) take into account a change in the government policy with simply distinguishing 
the period when B. Yeltsin was the President of the Russian Federation from the one when V. Putin stepped in. 
Kalotay (2008a) stressed an increasing role of the government in controlling those companies exploiting natural 
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6. Similarities and differences between Russian and Chinese multinational companies 
 
Russian MNCs nearly caught up Chinese MNCs during the past decade while the latter still 
benefited from the first mover advantage of their front running OFDI which commenced more 
than thirty years ago. Nevertheless the result is a more similar than different OFDI regime.  
 
 6.1. Russian multinationals: from opacity to globalisation …or copying China?  
 
Russian MNCs are used to disclose a very little information with regards to their economic 
activity abroad
14
. This strategy of opacity, non transparency and information concealment is a 
typical feature of Russian MNCs, even though it is slightly stepping back now. The expansion 
of Russian MNCs abroad has often been interpreted in a first phase as capital runaway, if not 
an exodus, toward friendly, more stable, and less risky foreign investment climates than in the 
Russian domestic market (Bulatov, 1998; Kalotay, 2004b; Vahtra & Liuhto, 2004). Round 
tripping FDI is exemplary of such strategy which has been more widespread in the 1990s than 
in the 2000s before the crisis.  
Another strategy in a sense follows up the one of former red multinationals developed to serve 
former Soviet foreign trade purposes. Rather frequent in Russian manufacturing industry, it is 
a market-seeking OFDI relaying previous export. Market-seeking FDI strategy pertains to 
traditional markets such as the CIS; it is also the rationale for Russian OFDI in Western 
markets where Russian firms face tough competition and are strongly challenged when 
entering in. Those Russian MNCs which invest abroad in mining, oil and gas industries have 
adopted a resource-seeking approach and attempted to take over their most needed suppliers 
abroad by means of M&As. Russian OFDI in the CIS is basically resource-seeking geared 
towards oil, gas and mining. The same strategy applies to the fairly recent Russian OFDI in 
Africa though it is mitigated here with a motive of accessing to new consumer markets.  
Russian MNCs have not yet adopted an efficiency-seeking strategy although they could have 
envisaged it in lower production cost CIS and developing countries. However a sort of 
efficiency-seeking OFDI emerged with the purpose of consolidating or re-integrating assets 
located in CIS countries and the CEECs (Filipov, 2010). Finally, Russian companies have 
                                                                                                                                                        
resources as the most specific factor that impeded applying all the FDI explanatory theories to the analysis of 
Russian MNCs.  
14
 For example, Gazprom for years did not provide those data requested by UNCTAD for its world investment 
report.  
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conducted an asset-seeking strategy based on M&As in view of acquiring Western technology 
and R&D intensive units.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
Trans-border M&As enable Russian MNCs to consolidate their global competitiveness in 
creating or reaching the advantages of a monopoly or dominant oligopoly position in some 
foreign markets. The main target for M&As by Russian MNCs is to take over European and 
North American firms. Between 2005 and 2010, M&As have primarily targeted an entry in 
industries linked to natural resources in the U.S., Canada, Italy, Switzerland and South Africa 
(Table 7). Big trans-border M&As are less frequent in the “close abroad” whose firms are of 
smaller size and less attractive in terms of high tech assets. A few exceptions are the 
Vimpelcom-Kyivstar, Gazprom-Beltransgaz, and Evraz-Sukhaya Balka deals. The share of 
the primary sector is steadily around 60% of all M&A deals while the share of the 
manufacturing industry is below 25% since 1997 (Table 8). A predominant resource-seeking 
motive is obvious. The proportion of M&As in Europe (CEECs included) peaked up in 1997-
2000 whereas the one in the CIS climaxed in 2001-2004. The first asset acquisitions appeared 
in developing countries since 2005 and the share of non-European (primarily North 
American) developed countries is around 20-25% of total M&A deals. The financial crisis 
impacted M&As undertaken by Russian MNCs downwards. While the overall number of 
trans-border M&A deals was 114 in 2007 and 119 in 2008, it fell down to 102 in 2009 and 70 
in 2010 (Filipov, 2011).  
Insert Table 8 about here 
OFDI by Russian MNCs directly in R&D is less the rule than exception so far, but it is 
significant sign of a step forward toward a more global strategy. For instance, Sistema entered 
the stock equity of an Indian company in the mobile telecommunication industry in 2008 and 
then attempted to acquire a German firm involved in microelectronics, Infineon, in 2009 
(Vahtra, 2010). Similarly, Sberbank had attempted (but failed) to participate into the purchase 
of Opel, a General Motors subsidiary, during the bankruptcy proceeding of this company, in 
view of capturing its high technology. In the iron and steel industry, Evraz, Severstal and 
Rusal have invested a big deal of money for technological development in their foreign 
subsidiaries whereas, in the oil industry, Lukoil and TNK-BP have acquired foreign firms in 
view of upgrading their own technological level. This spread of trans-border M&As by 
Russian MNCs in high-tech industries was backed and supported by the highest Russian 
authorities, even up to President Medvedev.  
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A few Russian MNCs seem to have turned to a global strategy in the past recent years, not 
only as far as their geographical orientation is concerned, but also in playing on all the cords 
of such a strategy (Andreff, 2003b). One of them consists in integrating all their value chain 
on a world scale; the different sequences of the production and trade process (input purchase, 
supply, production, products delivery, sales, and after-sale services) are allocated in various 
countries depending on profitability criteria. In recent years, this tendency was observed with 
Russian MNCs (Vahtra, 2010). In view of international chain value integration, the latter have 
often bought or merged assets located abroad, which is a second dimension of a global 
strategy. A third one is a global scope for asset-seeking OFDI, through M&As, into 
technological assets required for R&D and it often makes up for a decisive step forward on 
the path to globalising a MNC‟s strategy; here are some Russian MNCs today. A fourth 
dimension of global strategies lies in strategic alliances. Russian MNCs have formed strategic 
alliances with foreign partners – often other MNCs – since 2000: on average 40 per year with 
one 89 peak in 2007. This is one of the most representative evidence of evolving toward a 
global strategy and a sign of maturing strategies in some Russian MNCs. Moreover such 
alliances facilitate the entry into foreign markets. Still a few Russian MNCs are on the brink 
of switching to the above-defined genuine global strategy; some cases in point are Renova, 
TMK, and to some extent Gazprom, Lukoil, and NMLK. 
In 2008, President Medvedev appealed to Russian companies to “copy China” by expanding 
overseas and going on in a global spread of their foreign assets, even though the government 
has not yet developed a consistent policy framework – such as a perspective specialised 
agency for investment support under the auspice of Vneshekonombank - for assisting Russian 
MNCs in their global expansion. Let us have a comparative view over the Chinese model of 
MNCs which was recommended to be copied by Russian companies. 
 
 6.2. Similarities between Chinese and Russian multinationals: easy copying 
 
Chinese MNCs hold a first mover advantage compared to MNCs from all other transition 
economies. They began establishing subsidiaries abroad as early as 1979, primarily to open 
new export markets (Ye Gang, 1992). Since then they were ahead of Russian companies in 
investing abroad: OFDI from China in 1992 ($7,401 million) was of about the same 
magnitude as the one from Russia in 1998 ($7,385 million). In 2005, 3,429 parent companies 
of Chinese MNCs had settled about 280,000 foreign subsidiaries (and 948 Hong Kong MNCs 
with 9,072 additional subsidiaries abroad) while an unknown number – likely lower than 
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1,000 parent companies – of Russian MNCs were holding 1,176 foreign subsidiaries. In the 
2000s, Russian MNCs benefited from an “accelerated internationalisation”, a common surge 
for late-coming MNCs, since they were lagging behind Chinese MNCs in OFDI business.  
Insert Table 9 about here 
It is often stressed that the growth of Chinese MNCs has been boosted by a preliminary 
substantial inward FDI of Western MNCs into China since 1979 in tune with the so-called 
LLL - Linkage, Leverage, and Learning - approach (Matthews, 2002). Richet (2013) stresses 
the importance of instilling spillovers, incubators and learning by doing business with foreign 
investors in mainland China as a push factor in the emergence of Chinese MNCs. The former 
USSR opened up to inward FDI comparatively later, in 1987, and the LLL process was much 
slower in the 1990s given the bad domestic investment climate in Russia (Andreff, 1999a). 
After past technology transfers from foreign MNCs resulting in productivity spillovers to 
domestic Chinese firms, it is expected that China‟s OFDI would channel comparable transfers 
and spillovers from China to developing countries (Lian and Ma, 2011). It should make 
Chinese MNCs more acceptable in this sort of host countries.  
Insert Table 10 about here 
A significant share of Chinese OFDI consists in round tripping, since 75% of overall stock in 
2010 are invested in tax havens
15
 (Table 10), which is a much higher share than with Russian 
OFDI (58% in 2011). It is what most Chinese OFDI in Hong Kong, Macau, the Virgin and 
Cayman Islands are all about. Chinese investments to mainland China moving through Hong 
Kong account for nearly two-thirds of total OFDI. As a consequence the OFDI boom from 
mainland China is overestimated in most comments of official (MOFCOM and UNCTAD) 
data at least as regard its magnitude if not its momentum. This incurs that actual OFDI from 
mainland China was and still is markedly smaller than Russian OFDI in the past recent years.  
Except offshore centres, the next major host countries for Chinese OFDI are located in the 
neighbouring South East Asia and East Asia, i.e. 15 among the first 36 host countries. 
Western advanced economies are the next most important hosts, first of all Australia and the 
US (the Pacific Rim). Hence, Chinese MNCs, like Russian ones, are lean to privilege first a 
close geographical area and, second, developed market economies. However, they have 
already significantly spread in some African (South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Congo DR) and 
remote Latin American (Brazil, Peru) countries. At the end of the day, the geographical 
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 Indeed, only a part of Chinese OFDI transiting through tax havens, namely Hong Kong, are round tripping 
flows, but this applies to Russian OFDI as well. Unofficial assessment is that round tripping may be up to 50% 
of OFDI to Hong Kong.  
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distribution of Chinese OFDI is more diversified than the Russian one, namely in Latin 
America and Africa - where first Russian OFDI have emerged only recently.  
Chinese MNCs also invest in transition economies though the latter‟s share in Chinese OFDI 
is small (3% of 2010 overall stock) but its growth rate is the fastest in the past recent years, 
concentrated in the CIS and Mongolia (Korniyenko and Sakatsume, 2009), with an increased 
interest in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan). However, the focus in this area is 
definitely on Russia, ranked the 9
th
 host country for Chinese OFDI, and the 5
th
 one after 
Australia, Singapore, the US and South Africa when excluding offshore destinations and 
Hong Kong. For instance, Hisense owns a sales base in Russia and a production centre in 
Hungary, TCL disposes of factories in Russia and Poland. Chery Automobile invested in an 
assembly line in Russia in 2006. Geely holds a joint production plant in Russia and sales 
companies in Ukraine. In the textile industry, there are many Chinese investments in 
Mongolia. CNOOC is a major shareholder in the Kazakhstan North Caspian Operations 
Company. Thus, Chinese MNCs harshly compete with Russian MNCs since the mid-2000s in 
the latter‟s privileged areas for OFDI: Central Asia, other CIS countries and to some extent 
the CEECs. A deep asymmetry lies in there: China significantly invests in Russia whereas the 
reverse investment from Russia into China is much less impressive. When visiting Russia east 
of the Urals, a number of Chinese investors can be seen, and the local population intensively 
feels their presence, while Russian investors are nearly invisible in most Chinese provinces.  
Insert Table 11 about here 
The most striking feature in the industrial structure of Chinese OFDI is the high share of 
services, between one-third and two-fifths in the total. If one adds banking and trade to other 
services, the share of the tertiary sector is up to about 60% of overall OFDI (Table 12), which 
resembles the industrial structure of OFDI from developed countries. Investing abroad in the 
tertiary sector is typical of the global strategy conducted by major Western MNCs (Andreff, 
2003a). Chinese MNCs are about to stick to such strategy and likely to be ahead of Russian 
MNCs in this respect, none of the latter being known as a leader in the global services 
industry so far, except banking. The next important industry is mining where a resource-
seeking strategy of Chinese MNCs is at work. However, it is far from the overwhelming share 
of mining, oil and gas in Russian OFDI. With a noticeable difference: while Russian MNCs in 
this industry invest abroad looking for both new supply sources and new markets (oil and gas 
stations), the Chinese strategy is almost exclusively geared towards securing a supply of raw 
materials for the domestic economy. Chinese MNCs look for securing their supply in natural 
resources all around the world: basically in Australia, Russia and Canada among the first host 
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countries, but increasingly in Latin America, Central Asia, and Africa. Chinese OFDI in the 
manufacturing industry is less significant than in mining and its share decreases in the total 
from 2004 to 2010 (while the share of banking is rising).  
Insert Table 12 about here 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as privately-owned MNCs differentiate with regards 
to their motives of internationalisation. Chinese SOEs are attracted in countries with large 
endowment in natural resources and rather risky political environment. Private MNCs are 
more purely market seekers. Although all Chinese public and private firms have strategic 
intent with asset-seeking, the attraction is to commercially viable technology rather than core 
research content. Such technological asset-seeking strategy is primarily adopted when 
investing in advanced developed economies where Chinese MNCs are motivated by an access 
to strategic assets corresponding to China‟s strategic needs (Deng, 2007). Chinese MNCs 
have been portrayed as internationalising in order to improve their access to foreign 
proprietary technology and enhance competitiveness through diversifying their activity. 
Asset-seeking has been used on purpose. With domestic wage inflation in the recent years, 
some Chinese companies started relocating their production in geographically close countries 
with markedly lower unit labour costs
16
 such as Vietnam and North Korea. This signals the 
emergence of a new efficiency-seeking strategy which is likely to develop in the years to come 
with the current rise of comparative unit labour cost in China.  
Buckley et al. (2008) have tested the following explanatory model for the determinants (all 
variables in log) of Chinese OFDI: 
 
OFDI = a.GDPh + b.OILh + c. PATENTh + d.TD94 + e.BITh + f.ACBIT + g.DTTh + i.ACDTT + 
j.WTOh + k.CPh + l.DISh + m.RISKh + n.PPPh + o.ERATEh + p.INFh + q.EXPh + r.IMPh + 
s.INFDIh + uh 
 
where GDPh stands for GDP per capita in host countries h (captures market-seeking FDI 
motives), OILh for oil and gas exports of h to China (captures resource-seeking motives), and 
PATENTh for total annual patent grants in h (captures a technological asset-seeking strategy). 
The next variables are institutional one of which is endogenous TD94, the liberalisation of 
foreign exchange control in China in 1994. Exogenous institutional variables are: BITh the 
number of bilateral investment treaties concluded by a country with China, ACBIT the total 
number of BITs a country has concluded, DTTh the number of non double taxation treaties 
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 And common former communist culture and working conditions in the factories.  
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concluded by a country with China, ACDTT the total number of DTTs a country has 
concluded, WTOh membership of a country h in the WTO, CPh cultural proximity to China, 
and DISh the geographical distance of a country from China. The model is completed with 
control variables regarding political risk RISKh, purchasing power parity PPPh (to check the 
difference in inflation rates between a country h and China), exchange rate of the h country‟s 
currency against the renminbi ERATEh, inflation INFh, exports EXPh to China, imports IMPh 
from China, and a market openness to FDI index INFDIh, i.e. the ratio of inward FDI to GDP. 
Note that the model basically gathers pull factors, the only push factor being the liberalisation 
of the renminbi exchange rate. Obviously, more variables about Chinese governmental policy 
toward OFDI are missing on the push factor side. The significant variables coming out from 
testing are the market size, WTO membership, cultural proximity, all in favour of market-
seeking determinants. The exchange rate policy change (TD94) is significant but not with the 
expected sign: surprisingly, Chinese OFDI is negatively associated with the liberalisation of 
foreign exchange controls. In addition, OFDI should be determined by the „go global‟ 
measures (7 below) but they are not actually tested here. No significant relationship is found 
between Chinese OFDI and economic and institutional variables; OILh and PATENTh, 
paradoxically provide no support to resource-seeking and advanced technology and know 
how asset-seeking strategies by Chinese MNCs, no more than a gravity (distance) 
determination. All control variables are significant except host country risk; the contention 
that Chinese MNCs are attracted - or less reluctant to invest - in highly risky countries 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Morck et al., 2007) is not confirmed
17
. Compared with the above model 
for Russian MNCs, the primary strategy is market-seeking in either case whereas resource-
seeking strategy is empirically (econometrically) more crystal-clear with Russian MNCs.  
In an explanatory model rather similar to the previous one, Rodriguez and Bustillo (2011) 
introduce a host country‟s governance variable taken as usual as the average of the six World 
Bank‟s indicators of control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, 
regulation quality, rule of law, voice and accountability (Kaufmann et al., 2008 ). They do not 
find any significant relationship between governance and Chinese OFDI; strong governance 
in a host country neither attracts Chinese OFDI nor does low quality (thus risky) institutional 
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 Due to risks involved in institutional uncertainty, barter and networking business, guanxi relationships based 
on informal norms, mutual trust, personal connections, ethnic linkages, corruption and the like in the Chinese 
post-communist transition, Chinese companies are often assumed to be more capable (than Western MNCs) to 
deal with troublesome regulation and opaque political constraints. They easily survive in comparably weak 
institutions in Central Asian and African host countries. Such experiences are even considered as an intangible 
asset of Chinese MNCs by Morck et al. To say the least, Russian MNCs started evolving at home in no less 
corrupted, networking and informal surroundings in a first stage of Russia‟s economic transition, and they hold 
the same intangible asset. 
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framework hinder it. In addition, the resource-seeking motive is found significant which fits 
better with the actual strategies of Chinese MNCs observed at the enterprise level. However, 
poor institutions may well be linked to natural resource endowment anyway because rent 
appropriation leads to rent-seeking, patronage and corruption. This is what Kolstad and Wiig 
(2009) demonstrated meanwhile, testing the effect of the interaction between natural 
resources and poor institutions on Chinese OFDI. In host countries with poor institutions 
natural resources attract Chinese OFDI. Finally, Fung and Garcia-Herrero (2012) found that 
Chinese OFDI is more attracted (than Indian OFDI) to more corrupt countries, but this result 
is mostly driven by Chinese investment in African countries. Chinese OFDI primarily flows 
there into larger and poorer countries well endowed with fuels.  
Insert Table 13 about here 
The M&A mode of Chinese MNCs‟ entry suddenly took off after 2000 targeting both 
developed and developing countries, in particular since 2004 when the „go global‟ measures 
had materialised. In October 2004, a circular issued by the National Development Research 
Council (NDRC) and the Export-Import Bank of China explicitly promoted trans-border 
M&As. Renminbi appreciation against the US dollar and the Euro in the recent years has 
reduced the cost of Chinese M&As over Western companies. From 2000 to 2010, Chinese 
MNCs merged or acquired 83 companies located in the EU countries (Clegg and Voss, 2012). 
In transition economies, CNPC bought a $500 million stake during Rosneft‟s initial public 
offering and Sinopec acquired a 96.9% share in Udmurneft in Russia. CNPC acquired the 
North Buzachi oilfield in Kazakhstan through the purchase of Canada-based PetroKazakhstan 
and took a 25% stake in the Saylan oilfield in Azerbaijan, and son on (Table 13).  
However, some Chinese MNCs have failed in their M&A strategy, for instance TLC and 
SAIC in South Korea. It is reported that 90% of the 300 trans-border M&As achieved 
between 2008 and 2010 failed and translated into a 40% fall in the stock value of those 
companies involved (Richet, 2013). Thus, in presence of very high country risk, Chinese 
MNCs prefer greenfield investment. When a host country has stronger national innovation 
ability or higher level of human capital, Chinese firms tend to choose M&As. An increase in 
the cultural distance appears to induce Chinese MNCs to select M&As as well (Hu et al., 
2012). The number and magnitude of trans-border M&A deals by Chinese MNCs on average 
are much bigger than those observed for Russian MNCs.  
 
7. Which standing for multinationals in Russian and Chinese state capitalisms? 
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A study on MNCs based in the BRICs (Holtbrügge and Kreppel, 2012) concludes that while 
the internationalisation of Brazilian and Indian companies is primarily driven by economic 
motives, many Chinese and Russian firms also receive substantial political support from their 
governments to invest abroad, especially in strategically important industries. The Chinese 
government explicitly launched and then institutionalised a “go global” OFDI strategy while 
Russia proceeded with a less formal support policy to Russia-based MNCs relying on oral 
incentives, economic influence and some watchwords like “copy China”.  
 
 7.1. Russian multinationals: instrumental to Russia’s foreign policy 
 
A nice typology of Russian MNCs has been put forward (Liuhto and Vahtra, 2007) by 
crossing two criteria: the level of a firm‟s transparency, measured by its rating published in 
the Standard and Poor’s Russian Transparency and Disclosure Survey; and existing state 
control or ownership over the company. Thus, four types of Russian MNCs come out, 
respectively coined: 
. Non Transparent Patriots: these companies are under tight state control, most often in 
strategic industries linked to natural resources (ex: Rosneft, OMZ); 
. Transparent Patriots: refer to companies which somewhat disclose their financial accounts 
though they are in partial or overall state ownership; but they have already reached a strong 
position in international markets (ex: Gazprom
18
, Alrosa, Inter RAO UES); 
. Non Transparent Independents: are those companies that are not (or only slightly) controlled 
by the state but whose corporate governance misses transparency; they often invest abroad 
through offshore subsidiaries located in tax havens (ex: Evraz, Severstal, Rusal); 
. Transparent Independents: such companies are actually privately-owned and their strategies 
are not clearly influenced by the state or any political considerations (ex: Lukoil, Norilsk 
Nickel, Vimpelcom, MTS).  
The problem is to know how these categories of Russian MNCs evolve in the context of 
Russian state capitalism
19
 (Andreff, 2007a & 2009). Before the crisis, Russian MNCs were 
described as a form of soft power which had replaced the military power of the Russian 
regime, in particular throughout the “close abroad” (Vahtra, 2005). During the Yeltsin era, the 
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 Classifying Gazprom in this category, instead of the previous one, is obviously debatable.  
19
 Rutland (2008) prefers talking about a corporatist state or a hybrid form of oligarchic state capitalism; but a 
relative weakening of oligarchs‟ power is to be noticed in the 2000s and again in the wake of the financial crisis. 
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government was proactive through its privatisation
20
 programme in creating big privately-
owned companies in monopoly or oligopoly situation which swiftly transformed into MNCs. 
However Russia did not promote OFDI under the Yeltsin presidency. Under the Putin 
presidency, the Russian state has clearly shifted its objectives toward promoting OFDI, 
mostly in the service of national strategic goals. Since then Russia conducts a “national 
champions” policy providing support to companies investing abroad in key industries. 
In the 2000s, the government has reinforced its role in the economy through a swifter SOEs‟ 
expansion and partial re-nationalisation in some industries. Since 2001, state ownership 
appeared to be on the rise in Russia and this affected Russian MNCs as well. Public 
participation in previously privatised Gazprom increased from 38.4% to more than 50%, 
Gazprom acquired the privately-owned Sibneft while the state-owned Rosneft acquired 
various assets of the defunct Yukos. State participation in the stock equity of some Russian 
MNCs and their internationalisation strategy have increasingly been influenced by Russia‟s 
foreign policy. In addition, in 2007 seven big “state corporations” were launched whose CEOs 
were appointed directly by the president of the Russian Federation. The most important are 
Rostekhnologii, Rosnano, Rosatom, Rosoboronexport, and Vneshekonombank (VEB). These 
corporations are in charge of industrial restructuring through gathering activities into big 
industrial trusts under public control in aeronautics, shipyards, the nuclear energy, new 
technologies, and banking. They started up internationalising by acquiring technological 
assets abroad (Vahtra, 2010) while the pressure of the presidential administration on to them 
accentuated. They are not far from being MNCs whose strategies purely serve both a domestic 
policy of industrial modernising and Russia‟s foreign policy.  
Moreover, SOEs have widely participated to hostile raids over privately-owned companies at 
the Moscow stock exchange; Gazprom and primarily Rosneft have acquired the assets owned 
by Yukos and Samaraneftegaz. In 2008, when Dmitry Medvedev, a former CEO of Gazprom, 
was elected President of the Russian Federation, and Igor Sechin, a former CEO of Rosneft, 
was appointed Deputy Prime Minister, the relationships between the government and its state-
owned MNCs tightened a lot. The dividing line between government and business became 
totally blurred, more than at any time since the dawn of transition. The weakening political 
influence of oligarchs since the Yukos case and the government taking the big industrial-
                                                 
20
 Including as a result of the infamous and controversial scheme – even criticised by the World Bank – of loans 
for shares privatisation in 1996 which immediately came out with a phase of oligarchic capitalism in Russia 
(Andreff, 2005; Hedlund, 2001). These oligarchs are still today at the head of several significant Russian MNCs: 
Basic Element (Oleg Deripaska), Renova (Viktor Vekselberg), Alfa Group (Mikhaïl Friedman), Interros 
(Vladimir Potanin), Sistema  (Vladimir Evtuchenkov) and so on (Kuznetsov, 2007). 
 25 
financial groups owned by oligarchs in a firm hand strengthened the dimension of a state 
capitalism in Russia.  
In a meeting with Russian CEOs from the manufacturing industry in 2007, V. Putin enjoined 
them to proceed more and more with a production diversification, export of high tech 
products and investment abroad. Thus Russian MNCs, whatever privately or state-owned, are 
incited by the state to go on internationalising. In industries linked to raw materials and 
natural resources, the government intends to keep an overall direct and indirect control over 
economic activity, including over Russian MNCs. A part of the manufacturing industry is 
considered by the state as strategic (aeronautics, ship building, automotive industry) and is 
hardly open to free competition while the government intervenes on Russian MNCs‟ 
decisions. The rest of the manufacturing industry which has modernised (ex: telecoms, 
telephone) is more open to competition and here MNCs are much less dependent from the 
state. Nevertheless, in the heath of the financial crisis, in November 2008, V. Putin asked the 
CEOs of big Russian enterprises to discuss with the state administration of their perspectives 
and future orientation, industry by industry. The hydrocarbons industry, and its MNCs, is 
especially turned into a tool to serve Russia‟s international relationships, including through 
controlling the network of oil pipelines and gas pipes, which is also a means for a state control 
over exports (Locatelli, 2007). Indeed, many Russian MNCs achieve their OFDI for the sake 
of the national economic interest as it is meant by highest governmental authorities. Russian 
state-owned MNCs are often heavily influenced by or incited to stick to major objectives of 
Russia‟s foreign policy. 
However, the relationships between the state and big Russian companies/MNCs are no more 
rooted, as during the 1990s, in a context of state capture by private concerns (Andreff, 2007b), 
and no longer based on naked asset grabbing (Frye and Shleifer, 1997). Yakovlev (2010) 
showed that a sort of “model of exchange” has been reached in the relationships between the 
state and big companies. In this model, the latter benefit from subsidies, tax exemptions and 
various aids from the government but “in exchange” they have to bear without complaining 
some duties and additional costs such as a regulation of their product prices, frequent 
administrative supervision and a waste of time in their communication with the bureaucrats. 
Russian state capitalism has reached a kind of maturity in its evolution and adaptation to a 
globalisation context in crisis. Expansionist objectives of state-owned and privately-owned 
Russian MNCs are not autonomous vis-à-vis the government willingness to be a global player 
in the world economy. The Russian government trusts and supports them to become powerful 
actors in the world markets, in particular in the markets for energy. Russian political influence 
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is a push factor of Russian investment expansion for instance in Central Asia; the Russian 
government tries to help Russian MNCs in Asia and Africa as well.  
In the wake of the subprime crisis, the financial situation deteriorated in Russia and the 
economy collapsed into a recession in 2009. Even the big fortunes were affected by the crisis, 
namely those Russian oligarchs indebted to Western banks
21
. The government took advantage 
of the crisis to spread its grips over the whole Russian economy. Government assistance to 
indebted Russian MNCs came from the state-owned VEB which bailed them out and placed a 
representative in the companies boards who has the right to veto any debt or major asset sale. 
It took over Norilsk Nickel and should definitively own 25% of its stockholding equity 
belonging to O. Deripaska if he would not be able to reimburse a safety loan that he got from 
the government. M. Friedman, the CEO of Alfa Group, obtained $2 billion from VEB in order 
to rescue Vimpelcom, the biggest Russian mobile phone operator. NPOSaturn, a missile and 
aircraft engine builder received a financial aid from the government in exchange for 48.8% of 
its stockholding equity. Taking excuse of the crisis to help Russian MNCs the government 
sealed a deeper alliance with them typical of Russia‟s state capitalism evolving in the 
framework of a globalised economy. 
Finally the current specificity of Russian MNCs is due to how they are inserted into domestic 
state capitalism with: 1/ they benefited from the fastest international growth in the world, 
compared to MNCs of any other country, during the 2000s, until 2007, 2/ a competitiveness 
based on natural resources available in the homeland, 3/ an expansion abroad in which the 
Russian government plays an important role after 1999, even increasing since 2008; 4/ that is 
primarily achieved through merging and acquiring foreign companies by means of 
transactions which are not entirely transparent. However the more Russian MNCs will invest 
in Western Europe and North America, the more they will be requested to reveal their 
shareholders‟ structure and introduce more transparency in their transactions and finance. 
Overall, the WTO accession of the Russian Federation in December 2011 may trigger a new 
impetus for both OFDI from Russia and more transparent strategies.  
 
 7.2. “China Incorporated”: state promotion of Chinese multinationals 
 
State intervention in Chinese OFDI relies on the government quest for natural resources in 
short supply at home, a high degree of regulation and control over Chinese OFDI, and a high 
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number of state-owned MNCs. The role of the state in Chinese firms‟ OFDI is to formally 
push these emerging MNCs to go overseas by releasing various motivating policies and 
providing a support from the bureaucratic administration, formally use a state-oriented OFDI 
strategy to be enforced in Chinese MNCs‟ behaviours, and informally shape their choices 
through propagating a firm state ideology and national pride. In this perspective, the Chinese 
government had adopted a „go global‟ (zou chu qu) policy in 1999, officially expressed by 
President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji, which explicitly supported OFDI by Chinese 
companies; not only explicit, and contrary to Russia, this support was eventually materialised 
in three fiats passed in 2004-05
22
 which both promoted and regulated OFDI.  
Chinese OFDI is thus subject to multiple layers of hierarchical bureaucratic supervision and 
regulation. The first layer is the State Council which blueprints China‟s overall OFDI in the 
long term. A second layer, the NDRC (formerly the National Planning Commission) is 
responsible for putting forward OFDI strategies and plans. Guided by the NDRC strategic 
plan, the Department of Foreign Capital and Overseas Investment (a unit of NDRC) drafts a 
list of privileged industries for OFDI, examines and approves key OFDI projects. Then the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is responsible for conducting multilateral negotiations on 
foreign investment and trade treaties. The Department of Outward Investment and Economic 
Cooperation, part of MOFCOM, drafts operational OFDI regulation and supervises OFDI of 
non-financial enterprises. The Ministry of Finance conducts the taxation policy and provides 
financial support to OFDI through special funds. The State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), established in 2003 under the State Council authority 
to reform SOEs so as to create profitable “national champions”, is in charge of managing and 
supervising state-owned assets in non-financial industries, including those invested abroad. A 
third layer consists in several other departments which have to implement the policies 
designed by the above authorities such as the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) which surveys and approves the sources of funds, checks the legality of payments 
involved in OFDI, regulates and manages overseas foreign exchange accounts, the China 
Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Export & Credit 
Insurance Corporation.  
Most Chinese OFDI are undertaken after a state approval and with lax credits that fuel a soft 
budget constraint in state-owned MNCs. The approval procedure involves the NDRC to check 
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 “Interim Administrative Measures on the Approval of Overseas Investment Projects” taken by the NDRC; 
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Overseas Investment and Establishment of Enterprises” (Ministry of Commerce).  
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the firms‟ capabilities, the SAFE to approve the sources of funds, and the MOFCOM to check 
the conditions of the host country. Chinese embassies provide additional support to Chinese 
foreign investors by achieving feasibility studies for Chinese investment projects in the host 
country. Provincial officials are also involved: starting in 2003, the SAFE and the MOFCOM 
allowed foreign investments of less than U.S. $3 million to be approved at the provincial 
level. Thus, the state could act as the major player by explicitly and implicitly influencing 
firms‟ decision making as regard OFDI.  
In 2003, the NDRC defined the content of key OFDI projects which included: a/ natural 
resource seeking in areas where China is in short supply; b/ investment in manufacturing that 
promotes export of technologies, products, and equipments; c/ R&D collaborative projects 
which could bring in advanced technologies, managerial experience and talents; d/ M&As to 
increase firms‟ international competitiveness and spread their market. The state control over 
international activities of Chinese MNCs has been relaxed in recent years partly as China‟s 
WTO accession commitment and in response to increasing marketisation of the domestic 
economy (Sauvant, 2005). The government deregulated OFDI approval and foreign exchange 
control. Since 2006, it overtly conducted a national champions‟ policy fuelled with 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves, just like in Russia; or even the promotion of actually 
global champions since 2010. A new regulatory framework implemented in 2009 further 
eased and decentralised the OFDI approval procedures, eased the foreign exchange 
management for overseas projects, and broadened the sources of finance available for OFDI. 
Since 2010, in the 12
th
 Five-year Plan, an “accelerating go-out” strategy has been pushed 
forward which encourages Chinese companies to invest abroad under policy guidance and 
with a promised corporate autonomy. New rules for promoting OFDI with renminbi 
settlements have been announced in 2011. 
The efforts of China‟s big businesses to “go global” can be thought of as being part of a 
national power-building of China state capitalism‟s globalisation strategy. Facilitated by 
extended protection from the state, reaching beyond China‟s national boundaries, Chinese 
large SOEs raise investment capital and take risks that their foreign competitors, submitted to 
a hard budget constraint, do not (Yao et al., 2010). Indeed, the great bulk of Chinese OFDI 
stock is held by state-owned MNCs: 160 of them currently managed by the SASAC account 
for an estimated 84% of overall OFDI
23
. It is somewhat an overestimation since small scale 
investments are unlikely to be registered or approved by MOFCOM. A great number of small 
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enterprises have invested abroad, in particular since 2006, but the average size of their foreign 
investment projects is comparatively small (Gugler and Boie, 2008). 
Moreover, the government has effectively been the key operational decision maker in many 
investment projects and, with the creation of a sovereign investment fund in 2007, the China 
Investment Corporation (CIC), very active in trans-border M&As, it is not less so. The CIC is 
accountable for tunnelling foreign currency reserves into foreign equities, industrial OFDI, 
and investment banks and hedge funds. The first investments made by the CIC, including a 
stake in the U.S. investment finance company Blackstone, the investment bank Morgan 
Stanley and the Goldman Sachs distress fund resulted in major losses, partially a consequence 
of global financial crisis. Facing harsh criticism, the CIC reassessed its investment strategy 
and since then made smaller and more profitable acquisitions such as Apax Finance, 
Blackrock, Diaego, Nobel Holdings (Russia), South Gobi Energy or a share in Penn West and 
GDF-Suez. 
Chinese SOEs are large domestic players in major industries and backed up by the state as 
officially-recognised monopolies, for example in natural resources, infrastructure and 
telecommunications. As MNCs they are suspected by international competitors to still behave 
as monopolies outside China. Another fear deriving from Chinese OFDI by SOEs in some 
host countries is that it may act as a Chinese state increasing power and influence abroad (like 
with Russian MNCs), promoting the interests of the Chinese government and Communist 
Party. It is so because Chinese state-owned MNCs receive high level of state support in the 
form of credit lines and low interest rate loans from state-owned banks that reduce their 
capital cost and give them a competitive advantage over Western MNCs usually submitted to 
a hard budget constraint. Moreover, the CEOs of the largest 53 Chinese state-owned MNCs 
are directly appointed by the Communist Party and senior managers of most SOEs are largely 
appointed by the SASAC which is a concern both in terms of weak corporate governance 
structure and state influencing the whole companies‟ management. 
Even partly privately-owned MNCs such as Haier, Lenovo, Huawei, which promote 
themselves as private companies, though benefiting from some flexibility, keep strong ties 
with the government. Chinese SOEs not only possess more firm-specific advantages than 
private companies (Liu and Scott-Kennel, 2011) but benefit from competitive advantages 
built up by state OFDI regulation and promotion. However, the OFDI determinants are 
different for Chinese state-owned MNCs and privately-owned MNCs as tested by Amighini et 
al. (2012). Private MNCs are attracted in large markets and by host country strategic assets; 
they are averse to economic and political risks when choosing their location abroad on the one 
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hand; on the other hand, state-owned MNCs follow China‟s strategic needs and thus invest 
more in natural resources abroad, and are widely indifferent to political and economic 
conditions in host countries – a result which is tune with the one found for all Chinese MNCs 
by Rodriguez and Bustillo (2011). This means that state-owned MNCs have definitely a 
dominant strategic role in Chinese OFDI and are very sensitive to push factors while 
privately-owned MNCs react more intensively to pull factors.  
A significant difference between Chinese state-owned and Russian MNCs is that enterprise 
capabilities of the former have not been upgraded through privatisation; „corporatisation‟ was 
basically considered as enough to improve corporate governance in China. Listing their stocks 
in financial markets, at home and abroad, corporatised SOEs were transformed into joint stock 
companies benefiting from larger access to finance. However their highly concentrated 
ownership in state hands gives their largest or unique shareholder a substantial discretionary 
power to use the firm resources; there from result even more serious issues of insider control 
and possible minority shareholder despoilment than after Russian privatisations (Andreff, 
2005). A dominant control by the government also plants the worst seeds for flourishing 
corruption (Luo & Tung, 2007). Therefore, when transforming into MNCs, Chinese SOEs 
met deep criticisms, at least from Western competitors and host countries, about the 
accountability, transparency, and trustworthiness of their corporate governance, a criticism 
sometimes heard about state-owned Russian MNCs too. 
In such context, it may be contended (Ren et al., 2010) that three strategic motives of Chinese 
firms in conducting OFDI are to pursue country-level political objectives, seek for firm-level 
global competence, and escape domestic institutional constraints. The state has played a 
central and crucial role by designing formal and informal institutional framework to push up 
OFDI business. The authors argue that formal and informal institutional supports are sources 
of comparative ownership advantages for Chinese firms, i.e. a push factor for OFDI which is 
nevertheless contingent on the firm‟s size (small enterprises versus large MNCs) and 
ownership (private companies versus SOEs). Moreover, the recent rise of China in the global 
political and economic scene reflects a significant impact of informal institutions such as 
national pride and state ideology. What is good for Chinese MNCs is good for China, such is 
the state capitalist “China Incorporated” slogan nowadays. 
An avenue for further comparative research dwelling upon detailed firms‟ surveys would be 
to classify Chinese MNCs into the four aforementioned categories used for Russian MNCs. 
As a first sketch, most of the 160 biggest Chinese state-owned MNCs are likely to be Non 
Transparent Patriots; companies such as Haier, Huawei, Lenovo, Geely seem to increasingly 
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resemble Transparent Patriots while private companies such as Nanchuan-Bosai or Luanhe 
and small Chinese investors abroad probably are Transparent Independents except those 
which are not even registered (Non Transparent Independents) at the MOFCOM.  
 
 7.3. Similarities and differences: a final snapshot 
 
Structural
24
 and strategic similarities and differences between Russian and Chinese MNCs are 
summarised in Table 14. The most striking observation is that both have adopted a same 
regime of expansion abroad through OFDI (similar positive or negative signs on a same line 
are dominant). There is no surprise in that since Russian and Chinese MNCs originate 
together from the BRICs group and, even further, from the two only BRICs which have 
endeavoured a post-communist transition to a market economy. Within a same regime, their 
most visible differences are: less capital flight OFDI from China, less preliminary role of 
inward FDI in Russia, less Russian OFDI geared toward Latin America, an asymmetry 
between Chinese MNCs significantly investing in Russia and its “close abroad” while Russian 
MNCs are still shy investors in China and its neighbourhood, more privatised Russian than 
Chinese MNCs despite the back-pedalling nationalisation in Russia, more institutionalised 
OFDI promotion and the benefit of home currency appreciation in China. Some of these 
differences – strong currency, bigger foreign reserves and more structured state promotion of 
OFDI – may explain why Chinese MNCs practically were only slightly, if at all, affected by 
the crisis from 2009 on (Davies, 2010), contrarily to Russian MNCs.  
Insert Table 14 about here 
 
Conclusion 
 
The boom of Russian-based just like BRICs-based MNCs was really impressive in the past 
decade. Is Russia turning into a normal economy? Shleifer and Treisman (2005) contend it is 
so and contest the assumptions of an oligarchic capitalism or a “kleptocracy” or a corrupted 
economy prevailing in Russia. The same question mark is to be raised about China. Indeed, 
the most significant outcome of Russian transition is no longer or not only asset grabbing by a 
handful of oligarchs. A strategic coordination between big Russian MNCs and Russia‟s 
economic and foreign policies was strengthened by the government‟s decisions to counteract 
the effects of global crisis. The foundations of a state capitalism intending to weigh on the 
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global scene are more and more deeply rooted. Is this original? Not at all if we refer to the 
experience of various emerging countries with a strong state, of which China. Nowadays, 
state capitalisms accept to play the globalisation game in its own right and play on all cords of 
state influence and intervention in view of providing “institutionally embedded” competitive 
advantages to their state-owned MNCs. It is a success story so far: are not Gazprom, Lukoil, 
CNOOC, Sinochem, Norilsk Nickel, Vimpelcom, Huawei, Geely actually flourishing 
companies today and accounted for as standing among the global leaders in their respective 
industries? 
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Table 1: Outward foreign direct investment from Russia, 1994-
2011 
     
 ($ million)        
 1994 1997 2000 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
FDI outward stock 386 6410 20141 81974 255211 202837 248894 433655 362101 
FDI outflow 101 3184 3177 9601 45916 55594 43665 52523 67283 
FDI outflow/GFCF* 0.2% 3.8% 7.3% 9.2% 16.8% 15.0% 16.5% 17.4% 17.3% 
FDI outward stock/GDP 0.1% 1.5% 7.8% 14.0% 19.8% 12.0% 20.4% 29.2% 19.7% 
Outward/inward FDI stock 18.9% 44.6% 79.8% 83.2% 75.4% 95.3% 80.9% 74.7% 79.2% 
Source: UNCTAD (2012) and previous years.  * Gross fixed capital formation   
 
Table 2: Outward FDI stock from Russia and transition economies, 1997-2011   
 (million dollars)      
 1997 2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
RUSSIA 6410 20141 255211 202837 248894 433655 362101 
Armenia .. 33 13 24 77 85 163 
Azerbaijan .. 652 4676 5232 6114 5790 6323 
Belarus .. 16 37 50 81 205 284 
Georgia .. 57 80 130 122 155 742 
Kazakhstan .. 18 2149 5842 6786 16176 19924 
Kyrgyzstan .. 1 18 18 15 1 2 
Moldova 19 19 41 75 64 68 88 
Uzbekistan 222 321 .. .. .. .. - 
Tajikistan  .. 23 .. .. .. .. - 
Turkmenistan .. 31 .. .. .. .. - 
Ukraine 134 106 6077 7005 7259 7966 8158 
CIS 6785 21418 268301 221213 269682 464101 389627 
Bulgaria 35 88 599 1248 1309 1486 1697 
Estonia 215 429 5873 6686 6618 5779 4740 
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Hungary 900 2012 18282 14179 17494 20685 23756 
Latvia 222 241 776 1066 1006 833 887 
Lithuania 26 29 1565 1990 2310 2092 2014 
Poland 678 1491 19644 21814 26211 36839 50044 
Czech Republic 548 784 6971 9913 13871 15523 15470 
Romania 114 122 917 912 1731 1486 1487 
Slovakia 234 320 1609 1901 2744 2830 4210 
Slovenia 424 655 6123 8650 8745 7603 7142 
New EU members 3396 6171 62359 68359 82039 95156 111447 
Albania 68 82 19 147 171 145 202 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 5 40 15 29 52 82 153 
Croatia 638 1052 3495 3635 5849 4154 4529 
Macedonia .. 5 39 54 57 91 95 
Serbia .. .. .. .. 4268** 3928 3972 
Montenegro .. .. 219 310 ** 375 379 
South Eastern Europe 711 1179 3786 4174 10397 8775 9330 
CHINA* 20416 27212 95799 147949 229600 297600 365981 
CHINA & Hong Kong 157928 411944 1122386 923869 1063689 1246094 1411901 
* Excluding Hong Kong        
** Serbia and Montenegro        
Source: UNCTAD (2012) and previous years. 
 
Table 3: Comparative features of outward FDI from transition countries, 1999-2011  
   (in %)       
Country 
Outward FDI stock / 
GDP 
Outward / Inward FDI 
stock   IDP phase*   
  1999 2007 2011 1999 2007 2011 1999 2007 2011 
Albania 2.9 0.2 1.6 17.9 0.8 4.3 1 1 1 
Armenia 1.3 0.1 1.6 5.7 0.5 3.2 1 1 1 
Azerbaijan 10.6 15.9 10.0 13.0 70.9 69.4 2 3 3 
Belarus 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.4 0.8 2.2 1 1 1 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1.5 0.1 0.8 24.2 0.3 2.3 1 1 1 
Bulgaria 0.7 1.5 3.2 3.7 1.6 3.6 1 1 1 
CHINA 2.5 3.0 5.0 8.4 29.3 51.4 2 2 3 
with Hong Kong 15.9 30.3 18.7 45.3 74.3 76.3 3 3 3 
Croatia 5.1 6.8 7.1 25.4 7.8 14.7 2 2 2 
Czech Republic 1.3 4.0 7.2 4.0 6.9 12.4 2 2 2 
Estonia 5.3 27.6 21.4 11.1 35.4 28.3 2 3 3 
Georgia .. 0.8 5.2 13.7 1.5 8.0 1 1 1 
Hungary 3.2 13.2 17.0 8.1 18.8 28.1 2 2 3 
Kazakhstan .. 2.1 10.7 0.2 5.0 21.3 1 1 1 
Kyrgyzstan .. 0.5 .. 0.2 2.2 0.2 1 1 1 
Latvia 3.7 2.9 3.1 13.6 7.4 7.3 2 2 2 
Lithuania 0.2 4.1 4.7 1.3 10.7 14.5 1 2 2 
Macedonia 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.9 1.3 2.0 1 1 1 
Moldova 1.7 0.9 1.3 6.0 2.3 2.1 1 1 1 
Montenegro .. .. 8.3 .. 8.8 6.5 1 1 1 
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Poland 0.9 4.7 9.7 5.2 13.8 25.3 2 2 3 
Romania 0.4 0.6 0.8 2.4 1.5 2.1 1 1 1 
RUSSIA 2.3 19.8 19.5 51.9 75.4 79.2 2 3 3 
Slovakia 1.5 2.1 4.4 9.1 4.0 8.2 2 2 2 
Slovenia 2.9 13.3 7.4 22.6 59.2 47.2 2 3 3 
Tajikistan .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 1 
Turkmenistan .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 1 
Ukraine 0.3 4.3 4.9 3.2 16.0 12.5 1 2 2 
Uzbekistan .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 1 
* Phase ranking in Dunning's investment development path model     
Author's calculation with UNCTAD data.        
 
Table 4: The biggest Russian multinationals, 2004-2009    
       
Company, 2004* 
Foreign 
assets Company, 2007* 
Foreign 
assets Company 2009** Revenue Rank*** 
Lukoil 10579 Lukoil 20805 Gazprom 67806 12 
Gazprom 2951 Gazprom 17236 Lukoil 49654 23 
Sovcomflot 1762 Norilsk Nickel 12843 Rosneft 25325 57 
Norilsk Nickel 1413 Evraz 6221 TNK-BP 24124 61 
MTS 994 Severstal 5130 Gazpromneft 14758 106 
Rusal 743 Sovcomflot 4874 Surgutneftegaz 13584 114 
FESCO 675 Rusal 4533 Sistema 13015 118 
Severstal 666 MTS (Sistema) 3812 Severstal 9529 164 
PriSCO 657 Vimpelcom 3572 IDGC 9299 168 
Vimpelcom 602 Novolipetsk Steel 1594 Tatneft 8629 177 
TNK-BP 438 PriSCO 1208 Norilsk Nickel 7302 197 
OMZ 347 TNK-BP 1150 MTS 7064 203 
InterRAO 261 FESCO 1055 Evraz 6783 210 
Acron  119 OAO Koks 978 Transneft 6478 224 
Ritzio 
Entertainment 47 Eurochem 901 X 5 Retail 6363 227 
Alrosa 31 InterRAO 799 Vimpelcom 6353 228 
Sitronics 31 TMK 606 Rusal 5871 245 
Evraz  0 Mirax 470 AvtoVAZ 4525 284 
Novolipetsk Steel 0 GAZ 384 Novolipetsk Steel 4482 288 
IMH/OAO Koks 0 ChTPZ 262 Mechel 4138 306 
Eurochem 0 Acron 261 GAZ Avto 4015 312 
TMK 0 Alrosa 231 Magnit 3908 317 
Mirax 0 Sitronics (Sistema) 226 Magnitogorsk Steel 3709 327 
ChTPZ 0 OMZ 207 Bashneft 2872 394 
GAZ .. 
Ritzio 
Entertainment 200 Aeroflot 2718 416 
Sources: * Skolkovo (2008) in million $.  Rushydro 2621 431 
** Handelsblatt Research 2010: in million €.  Mosenergo 2590 441 
*** rank among the biggest 500 European companies.  Salavatnefteorgsintez 2471 457 
    Slavneft 2460 461 
 38 
    TMK 2402 474 
 
Table 5: Significant divestment deals by Russian companies in 2008-2010  
    
Vendor Foreign assets Industry Acquiring firm 
 located in:   based in: 
2008    
Arbat Prestizh Ukraine perfumes, cosmetics Ukraine 
N Trans Estonia seaport operator Netherlands 
Lukoil Poland gas stations Poland 
Gazprom Media Moldova media services USA 
Nakhodka Re Ukraine reinsurance services USA 
2009    
TMK USA metallurgy USA 
Atomredmetzoloto Kazakhstan uranium mining Netherlands 
Rolf GK Netherlands car dealer Japan 
Bryansk Machine Building Ukraine machine building Ukraine 
AvtoVAZ Finland car manufacturing United Kingdom 
Managing company Estar Ukraine steel manufacturing Ukraine 
Gidromashservis Ukraine electric engine manuf. Ukraine 
Antanta PIO Global Invt. Group Ukraine holding company Ukraine 
Basic Element Austria asset invt. holding Austria 
Nutritek Estonia food Estonia 
Veritas SPA Italy services Italy 
Millhouse LLC Virgin Islands asset management Virgin Islands 
2010    
Farmstandart Latvia pharmaceuticals Latvia 
Gazprom Cayman Islands oil, gas Ireland 
Baltika Kazakhstan beer manufacturing Kazakhstan 
Petrovsky Bank Bosnia Herzegovina banking Bosnia Herzegovina 
Ingosstakh Austria insurance services Belgium 
Russian Alcohol Group Georgia alcohol manufacturing Georgia 
Mirax Group Turkey construction services Turkey 
Kavitatsionnye Tekhnologii Ukraine railway wagons Ukraine 
Adapted from Filipov (2011).     
 
Table 6: Major host countries for Russian FDI, 2011 stock   
 (million $)     
Host country Russian FDI % Host country Russian FDI % 
Cyprus 121596 33.6 St Kitts & Nevis 2681 0.7 
Netherlands 57291 15.8 Kazakhstan 2514 0.7 
Virgin islands 46137 12.8 Bermuda 2497 0.7 
Switzerland 12679 3.5 France 1989 0.5 
Luxembourg 11599 3.2 Ireland 1849 0.5 
United Kingdom 10662 2.9 Isle of Man 1546 0.4 
United States 9501 2.6 Serbia 1496 0.4 
Jersey 7035 1.9 Lithuania 1464 0.4 
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Germany 6692 1.8 Czech Republic 1463 0.4 
Gibraltar 5701 1.6 Italy 1435 0.4 
Bahamas 5481 1.5 Armenia 1417 0.4 
Belarus 4663 1.3 Sweden 1414 0.4 
St Vincent Grenad. 4421 1.2 Vietnam 1078 0.3 
Ukraine 4395 1.2 Montenegro 1072 0.3 
Austria 4229 1.2 Finland 1038 0.3 
Turkey 3654 1.0 India 982 0.3 
Spain 3535 1.0 Uzbekistan 947 0.3 
Bulgaria 2748 0.8 Canada 850 0.2 
Source: Central Bank of Russia.     
 
Table 7: Significant transborder mergers-acquisitions 
achieved by Russian companies in 2005-2010 
   
      
Buyer Acquired Target Industry acquired Value 
 company country  % million $ 
Norilsk Nickel Lion Ore Mining Canada Mining, metallurgy 100 5650 
Vimpelcom ZAO Kyivstar GSM Ukraine Telecommunication 100 5500 
Evraz IPSCO Canada Canada Mining, metallurgy 100 4200 
Rusal SUAL Glencore Switzerland Metallurgy n.a. 3600 
Altimo Turkcell Turkey Telecommunication 13 3200 
Gazprom Beltransgaz Belarus Oil, gas 50 2500 
Evraz Oregon Steel USA Mining, metallurgy 100 2300 
Evraz Sukhaya Balka GOK Ukraine Iron ore 99 2189 
Lukoil Nelson Resources United Kingdom Oil, gas 100 2000 
Lukoil ISAB Italy Oil, gas 49 1850 
Renova Oerlikon Switzerland High tech 45 1600 
Alfa Group Turkcell Turkey Telecommunication 7 1600 
Mechel Oriel Resources United Kingdom Mining, metallurgy 47 1500 
Norilsk Nickel Gold Fields Ltd South Africa Mining, metallurgy 20 1200 
TMK IPSCO Tubulars USA Steel pipes, tubes 100 1200 
Severstal Penfold Capital Acq. Canada Finance 95 1115 
Severstal Esmark USA Mining, metallurgy 100 978 
Pyaterochka Holding Formata Holding Netherlands Grocery stores 100 940 
Gazprom NIS Serbia Oil, gas 51 900 
Severstal PBS Coal USA Mining, metallurgy 100 877 
Novolipetsk Steel Duferco USA & EU Metallurgy n.a. 806 
NMLK Steel Invest Finance USA, IT, BEL Mining, metallurgy 50 800 
Severstal Sparrows Point USA Mining, metallurgy 100 775 
Renova Sulzer Switzerland Machinery 32 725 
Severstal Lucchini Spa Italy Metallurgy n.a. 700 
Renova Energetic Source Italy Electricity 80 700 
Evraz Highvel Steel South Africa Mining, metallurgy 79 678 
Evraz Palini & Partoli Italy Mining, metallurgy 75 620 
Lukoil SNG Holdings Uzbekistan Oil, gas 100 575 
Lukoil Jet Petrol Stations CZ,PL,HU, FIN Oil, gas n.a. 560 
Basic Element Hochtief AG Germany Metallurgy n.a. 525 
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Vimpelcom ArmenTel Armenia Telecommunication 100 500 
Global Info. Services Altis semiconductors France Machinery n.a. 449 
Severstal WCI Steel Inc. USA Mining, metallurgy 100 443 
Rusal Eurallumina Spa Italy Metallurgy n.a. 420 
Norilsk Nickel OMG Nickel Assets AU & FIN Metallurgy n.a. 408 
Severstal Celtic Resources Plc Ireland Mining n.a. 315 
Evraz Vikovice Steel Czech Republic Machinery n.a. 287 
Amtel Vredestein Banden  Netherlands Chemicals n.a. 201 
Source: adapted from UNCTAD, Filipov (2010) and Vahtra (2010).   
 
Table 8: Trans-border mergers and acquisitions achieved by Russian  
companies: industrial and geographical distribution, 1992-2008  
 million $ (%)    
Industry 1992-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004 2005-2008 
Total 511 1700 5498 55850 
Primary sector 45 (8,8) 1098 (64,6) 2980 (54,2) 33485 (60.0) 
Manufacturing industry 451 (88,3) 146 (8,6) 661 (12.0) 13430 (24.0) 
Services 15 (2,9) 456 (26,8) 1857 (33,8) 8935 (16.0) 
Region      
CIS countries .. 61 (3,6) 1233 (22,4) 9039 (16,2) 
Europe 311 (60,9) 1237 (72,8) 3069 (55,8) 29888 (53,5) 
Other developed countries 200 (39,1) 402 (23,6) 1196 (21,8) 13712 (24,6) 
Developing countries .. .. .. 3210 (5,7) 
Adapted from Vahtra (2010).    
 
Table 9: The biggest 50 Chinese multinationals ranked by foreign assets, 2010 
    
Rank Company Rank Company 
1 China Unicom Corporation 26 China Huneng Group 
2 China National Petroleum (CNPC) 27 China Communication Construction Co, Ltd 
3 China Petrochemical Corporation 28 China Vanke Co, Ltd 
4 China Resources (Holdings) Co, Ltd  29 China Metallurgical Group 
5 China National Offshore Oil (CNOOC) 30 Ynazhou Coal Mining Company Ltd 
6 China Merchants Group 31 SINOTRANS Changjiang Nl Shipping Corp. 
7 China State Construction Engineering Co 32 State Grid Corporation of China 
8 China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) 33 China North Industries Group Corporation 
9 Sinochem Corporation 34 Guangzhou Yuexiu Holdings Limited 
10 China Mobile Commiunications Corporation 35 China Guandong Nuclear Power Holding 
11 Huawei Technologies Co, Ltd 36 China Ship Buiding Industry Corporation 
12 Aluminum Corporation of China 37 ZTE Corporation 
13 China National Cereals, Oils & Foodstuffs  38 Shougang Corporation 
14 China Power Investment Corporation 39 China National Chemical Corporation 
15 Legend Holdings Ltd 40 Yantai Xinyi Investment Ltd 
16 Geely Holding Group 41 Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation 
17 China Minmetals Corporation 42 Changsha Zoomlion HI S&T Development 
18 CITIC Group 43 Shum Yip Holdings Company Ltd 
19 China Poly Group Corporation 44 China Non Ferrous Metal Mining & Constr. 
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20 Beijing Enterprises Group Company Ltd 45 SINOHYDRO Co, Ltd 
21 Hunan Valin Iron & Steel Co, Ltd 46 Jiangsu Shagang Group 
22 China Shipping Company 47 China International Marien Containers Ltd 
23 China National Aviation Holding Corp. 48 Wuhan Iron & Steel Corporation 
24 GDH Limited 49 China National Gold Group Corporation 
25 SinoSteel Corporation 50 Jinchuan Group Ltd 
Source: MOFCOM Statistical Bulletin.   
 
Table 10: Major host countries for Chinese OFDI, 2010 stock   
      
Host country Chinese FDI % Host country Chinese FDI % 
Hong Kong 199056 62.8 Nigeria 1211 0.4 
Virgin Islands 23243 7.3 Indonesia 1150 0.4 
Cayman Islands 17256 5.4 Cambodia 1130 0.4 
Australia 7868 2.4 Japan 1106 0.3 
Singapore 6069 1.9 Thailand 1080 0.3 
Luxembourg 5787 1.8 Vietnam 987 0.3 
USA 4874 1.5 Zambia 944 0.3 
South Africa 4153 1.3 Algeria 937 0.3 
Russia 2788 0.9 Brazil 924 0.3 
Canada 2603 0.8 Laos 846 0.3 
Macau 2229 0.7 United Arab Emir. 764 0.2 
Myanmar 1947 0.6 Saudi Arabia 761 0.2 
Pakistan 1828 0.6 Iran 715 0.2 
Kazakhstan 1591 0.5 Malaysia 709 0.2 
Germany 1502 0.5 Turkmenistan 658 0.2 
Sweden 1479 0.5 Peru 654 0.2 
Mongolia 1436 0.5 South Korea 637 0.2 
United Kingdom 1358 0.4 Congo DR 630 0.2 
Source: calculated from MOFCOM 2010 Statistical Bulletin.   
 
Table 11: Geographical distribution of Chinese FDI 
outflows, 2005-2010 
    
Region % Region % 
South East Asia 13 Latin America 13 
East Asia 11 North America 12 
South Asia 5 Africa (sub Saharan) 10 
Total Asia* 29 Oceania 7 
Western Europe 23 Middle East & North   
Central Eastern Europe 1 Africa 5 
Total Europe 24 Total 47 
* without Hong Kong    
Source: Apoteker (2012). 
 
Table 12: Industrial structure of the Chinese OFDI stock, 2004-2010  
 (%)   
Industry 2004 2007 2010 
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Agriculture, forestry, fishing 1.9 1.0 0.8 
Mining  13.3 12.7 14.1 
Manufacturing 10.1 8.1 5.6 
Construction, real estate, infrastructures 4.8 6.5 5.7 
Transport, storage 10.2 10.2 7.3 
Trade (wholesale & retail) 17.5 17.2 13.2 
Banking 0 14.2 17.4 
Services 42.2 30.1 35.9 
Source: adapted and calculated from the MOFCOM 2010 Statistical Bulletin 
 
Table 13: Significant transborder mergers-acquisitions achieved  
by Chinese companies in 2004-2011   
    
Buyer Acquired company or Industry Value 
 country of acquisition  million $ 
CNOOC (1) Unocal Oil 18500 
Chinalco Rio Tinto (12%) Mining 14280 
Sinopec Addax Petroleum (Swizt.) Oil 7200 
Sinopec Repsol, Brazil (40%) Oil 7100 
China Investment Corp Morgan Stanley (9.9%) Banking 5000 
Sinopec Conoco Phillip, Canada (9%) Oil 4650 
COSL Awilco Offshore Drilling 3890 
Huaneng Power Tuas Power (Singapore) Power 3070 
Sinopec Udmurneft Oil 3500 
CNPC PetroKazzakhstan Oil 3960 
CNOOC Bridas (Argentina) Oil 3100 
Sinochem Peregrino field (Brazil) 40% Oil 3070 
China Investment Corp Blackstone Group L.P. Private equity 3000 
Yanzhou Coal Felix Resources (Australia) Coal 2950 
CNPC KaMunaigas Gas 2600 
CNOOC Awilco Offshore (Norway) Oil 2500 
CNOOC Pan American, Argentina 30% Oil 2470 
Sinopec Occidental (Argentina) Oil 2450 
CNOOC South Atlantic Petroleum Oil 2268 
CNOOC Chesapeake Energy, US (33%) Oil 2200 
Investor Group Kazakhstan Energy 1874 
Geely Volvo Automobile 1500 
Lenovo Group IBM PC Business Computers 1760 
CNPC National Iranian Oil Company Oil 1760 
CNPC Athabasca Oil Sands Oil 1740 
Wanhua Polyurethanes Borsodchem (Hungary) Chemicals 1701 
China Investment Corp Lexington Partners (USA) Finance 1500 
CNPC Shell Syria Energy 1500 
Sinochem Makhteshim-Agan, Israel, 60% Agriculture 1440 
CNPC Canadian Energy Oil 1420 
Minmetals Oz Minerals Mining 1350 
Sinosteel Midwest (Australia) Iron 1300 
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Haier America Trading Maytag Corp Appliances 1280 
CNPC Mynamar Oil & Gas Construction 1280 
Huaneng Power IntrerGen, US (50%) Power 1230 
China Investment Corp Penn West, Canada (5%) Oil 1220 
Xingxing Iron & Minmetals Kelachandra & Manasara Steel 1200 
Bosai Minerals Ghana Minerals  Aluminium 1200 
Jiangsu  Itaminas (Brazil) Iron 1200 
PetroChina Keppel, Singapore Petroleum Oil 1020 
CITIC Securities  Bear Stearns (9.9%) Banking 1000 
State Grid Cobra Elecnor & Isolux, Brazil Power 990 
China Investment Corp Apax Finance Finance 960 
Sinochem Emeral Energy Energy 880 
Hunan Valin Iron & Steel Fortescue Metals (16.5%) Iron 770 
Sinopec Chevron Indonesia Gas 680 
Hudian Sintez (Russia) (51%) Gas 650 
China Investment Corp Goldman Sachs distress fund Finance 600 
Sinopec AED (Australia) (60%) Oil 560 
China Merchants Group Loscam Shipping 550 
China Investment Corp Blackrock Finance 530 
China Metallurgical Palmer‟s Mineralogy (10%) Coal 520 
Shanghai Automobile Ssangyong Motors Automobile 509 
Sinochem Soco (Yemen) Oil 470 
China Merchants Group Aitken Spence, Sri Lanka Shipping 450 
Jinchuan  Continental Metals, Canada Mining 420 
Wuhan Iron & Steel MMX Mineracao, Brazil 22% Iron 400 
Guandong Rising Asset Caledon (Australia) Coal 400 
China Investment Corp Diaego Food 370 
Huawei Technologies 3Com Corporation (16.5%) (2) Telecommunication 363 
Chalco  GIIG (Malaysia) Aluminium 350 
China Int. Marine Containers Yantai Raffles Shipyard Shipping 330 
Shanghai Automobile GM India (50%) Automobile 330 
China Minsheng UCBH Holdings (10%) Banking 317 
China Investment Corp Nobel Holdings (Russia) Oil 300 
Tencent Digital Sky, Russia (10%) Technology 300 
Jiangsu Shagang Bulk Minerals & Grange Iron 270 
China Railway Materials  African Minerals,Sierra Leone Iron 260 
Zoomlion Compagnia Forme Acciaio Construction 250 
China Investment Corp South Gobi Energy, Mongolia Coal 250 
Baosteel Aquila Resources (Australia) Iron 240 
Jinchuan Group Wesizwe Platinu Mining 230 
Nanjing Automobile MG Rover Automobile 205 
Mindray Medical Datascope Corporation unit Medical devices 202 
CNPC Pluspetrol Norte Oil 200 
Hanlong Mining Moly Mines Iron 200 
BAIC Saab Automobile 200 
Baiyin, CITIC & Chang Xin Oxus (Uzbekistan) Mining 190 
Ningbo Qingchun Clothing Youghwa Weaving & Dyeing Textile 184 
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Cosco Peninsular & Oriental Steam Shipping 181 
 Navigation   
Three Gorges EuroSibEnergo (Russia) Power 170 
China Merchants Group Ming Wah Universal  Transportation 168 
CNPC Turkmenistan Motor, transport 167 
Sinopec First International Oil Oil 160 
WuXi PharmaTech AppTec Laboratory Biopharmaceuticals 151 
Great Wall Motor Litex Motors (Bulgaria) Automobile 120 
China Investment Corp GDF Suez (30%) Electric services n.a.  
(1) Eventually failed due to national security issues.   
(2) Failed due to political objections and national security reasons.  
Source: adapted from H. Rui, G.S. Yip, S. Prashantham (2010) and Salidjanova (2011). 
 
Table 14: Similarities and differences between Russian and Chinese multinationals 
   
OFDI features and MNCs strategies Russian MNCs Chinese MNCs 
Market-seeking strategy ++ ++ 
Resource-seeking strategy ++ ++ 
Efficiency-seeking strategy -- -- 
Asset-seeking strategy ++ ++ 
Global strategy (being on the brink of) -- -- 
Transborder mergers & acquisitions ++ ++ 
Round tripping OFDI + ++ 
Capital flight OFDI + -- 
Preliminary LLL role of inward FDI -- + 
Privileging close markets for OFDI ++ ++ 
OFDI in developed countries' markets + + 
OFDI in Latin America -- + 
OFDI in Africa + ++ 
Mutual bilateral FDI* -- ++ 
FDI on reciprocal privileged markets** -- + 
Proportion of SOEs among big MNCs + ++ 
MNCs originating in the privatisation drive + -- 
Monopoly/dominant oligopoly in home market ++ + 
State appointment of SOEs/MNCs managers ++ ++ 
MNC corporate governance transparency -- -- 
State (government) support to OFDI + ++ 
Institutional (state) OFDI promotion -- + 
State interference/control in OFDI ++ + 
Informal institutions, corruption, networks ++ ++ 
National pride and state ideology + ++ 
OFDI in the primary sector (oil, mining, etc.) ++ + 
OFDI in the manufacturing industry + + 
OFDI in the tertiary sector + ++ 
State foreign reserve accumulation + ++ 
Exchange rate appreciation 0 + 
(++) + = (very) strong or significant 0 = absent  
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 -- = weak or of secondary importance   
* Chinese OFDI in Russia and Russian OFDI in China  
** Chinese OFDI in Russian "close abroad" and Russian OFDI in China's close Asia 
 
 
 
